American Constitutional Law and Restrictions on the Content of Private International Broadcasting by Ruddy, F. S.
F. S. RUDDY*
American Constitutional Law and
Restrictions on the Content of
Private International Broadcastingt
I. Freedom of Information v. Intrusion Broadcasting
America has traditionally championed freedom of information as a prin-
ciple among nations, and the position was well expressed by Holmes:
... the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get acceptance in the
competition of the market, and the truth is the only ground upon which [men's]
wishes safely can be carried out.'
Yet the principle of freedom of information is not an American monopoly.
It exists in the organic law of many countries, in the Declaration of Human
Rights of the United Nations, and in major United Nations recommenda-
tions and resolutions.
This principle is presently under serious attack. Nations which would
restrict this principle have urged that the resources necessary to place a
broadcasting satellite in orbit limit this capability to a few nations which
become, in George Orwell's phrase, more equal than others. Fear has been
expressed that broadcast satellites, particularly television satellites, may be
used as a means of "intruding" into the internal affairs of nations by
disseminating political propaganda, by misguiding public opinion, by in-
troducing materials customarily or legally proscribed in the recipient na-
tion, by fomenting strife, and by imposing different cultures, and political or
social systems on others.
It has been urged by the U.S.S.R., France and several Latin American
and other countries participating in the Working Group on Direct Broad-
cast Satellites of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
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1Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 at 630 [1919].
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Outer Space, and in other international forums, that steps be taken to
prevent the misuse of broadcasting satellites. France, at the 1963 Space
Conference, suggested a complete prohibition of broadcasting from satel-
lites in the same manner that the Radio Regulations of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) presently prohibit broadcasting from ob-
jects outside national territories. Recently, France has suggested a detailed
code governing program content, while other proposals would prohibit
international satellite broadcasting without the explicit prior consent of the
recipient governments, and urge the formation of a new international regu-
latory body.
The question of the legal regime governing satellite broadcasting is
beyond the scope of this paper, except perhaps to note that such a rrgime
is already in existence.2 This paper is concerned with the Constitutional
issues presented by an agreement by which the United States undertakes
to restrict transmissions by its citizens.
II. The Constitutionality of Restrictions on the
Content of Private International Broadcasting
The possibility of direct international television broadcasting by satellite
to ordinary home receivers, while no less than fifteen years away according
to expert opinion, has given rise to demands by some countries for recogni-
tion of a right in recipient countries to controliwhat their people receive.3 A
2The principle of freedom of information is not without restrictions. Freedom of speech
does not include a cry of "fire" in a crowded theater, and the various texts which proclaim the
free flow of information specify limits on its exercise. For example, the United Nations
Charter acknowledges the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign
states. Article 20 of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights forbids all
incitement to war, while Article 2 of the draft Convention on Freedom of Information does
not extend this freedom to areas in which to do so would threaten national security, jeopardize
the community of nations, incite civil or international strife, pillory the founders of religion;
instigate crime; threaten public health, morals, or personal rights, honor and reputation and
the proper administration of justice.
Various U.N. resolutions condemn propaganda which undermines rapport between na-
tions; e.g. Resolution 110 (11) of the U.N. General Assembly (November 3, 1947), in-
corporated into the Outer Space Treaty condemns propaganda likely to threaten the peace.
The general contents of the Outer Space Treaty, signed by the U.S.A., U.K. and the
U.S.S.R., allay fears concerning broadcasting satellites. Further, the regulations of the In-
ternational Telecommunication Union forbid harmful interference by sound or television
broadcasts.
While not exhaustive, the foregoing are indicative of laws and regulations already in
existence. Against such a background one notes that the U.N. Working Group on Direct
Broadcast Satellites (2nd Session) reported that those laws and regulations already in exis-
tence form the basis of a customary law of satellite broadcasting, which take into account the
free flow of information, the freedom of space, and the rights of recipient nations.3Although international broadcasting exists today without satellites, satellites make
worldwide intercontinental television broadcasting possible for the first time. Television's
greater impact has given rise to fears of unwanted transmissions and demands for recipient
protection. One need only reflect on the recent World Cup Football matches which were seen
via satellite by 700,000,000 people to get an idea of the potential of this mode of com-
munication.
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. I
104 INTERNA TIONAL LA WYER
recipient country would always be free to prevent the reception of unwant-
ed broadcasts by jamming penalizing listening or watching, or other in-
ternal means, but the anticipated inadequacy of such means has led to
demands that the broadcasts be restricted at their source.
While such demands are not entirely crystallized at this stage, they
generally are couched in terms of international agreements 4 under the
terms of which a transmitting country will not broadcast, or permit its
people to broadcast, certain types of undesirable material. Continuing
demands for such an agreement raise the question of the extent to which
the United States might constitutionally enter into a treaty to restrict the
content of international broadcasts by satellite.
The question is as original as satellite communications themselves, 5 and
does not lend itself to facile constitutional analysis. Acknowledging this
limitation, as well as the vagaries of a changing international situation, the
variable nature of the restrictions, and possible constitutional develop-
ments, one may nonetheless extrapolate on the constitutionality of such an
agreement.
It is clear that limitations of the type already mentioned would raise at
least a grave First Amendment question. Review of the relevant materials
indicates that the United States has the right to license international broad-
casting to serve some public interest (thereby limiting transmissions), and
to prohibit direct calls for war. It apparently lacks the right, at least in the
absence of a clear and present danger, to censor broadcasts under loosely
worded standards such as those already mentioned.
Clearly, the First Amendment applies to broadcasting, but because of
the medium's intrinsic scarcity, it it also clear that radio may be regulated
under a reasonable public-interest standard. The United States Supreme
Court said, in National Broadcasting Company v. U.S.:
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited
facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio is inherently unavai-
lable to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other
modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because it
cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it, must be denied. 6
4Thus, there could be bilateral or multilateral treaties enforced through prior censorship,
or through criminal and/or administrative sanctions. Some form of international body to
administer agreed standards is also conceivable.
5The Federal Communication Commission's rules now require international broadcast
stations to render a service which "will reflect the culture of this country and which will
promote international goodwill, understanding, and cooperation" 47 CFR 73.788. The validity
of this requirement has not been reviewed judicially. Nor has the prohibition in 18 U.S.C.
§ 953 against communications to foreign governments intended to influence their relations
with the United States.
6319 U.S. 190, at 226-227.
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With respect to the application of the First Amendment to the licensing
scheme of the Communications Act, the court said in the same case:
The question here is simply whether the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, by announcing that it will refuse licenses to persons who engage in
specified network practices (a basis for choice which we hold is comprehended
within the statutory criterion of 'public interest'), is thereby denying such
persons the constitutional right of free speech. The right of free speech does
not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio without a license.
The licensing system established by Congress in the Communications Act of
1934 was a proper exercise of its power over commerce. The standard it
provided for the licensing of stations was the "public interest, convenience, or
necessity." Denial of a station license on that ground, if valid under the Act, is
not a denial of free speech.7
Since not every speech medium is "necessarily subject to the precise
rules governing any other particular method of expression," 8 the courts
have permitted a degree of control over radio program content that might
well be invalid if applied to other media. In domestic radio, the protected
public interest is that "of the listening public." 9 Such protection may
extend not only to prohibitions against speech plainly beyond the protec-
tion of the First Amendment,' 0 but also to requirements of fair treatment of
political candidates and controversial issues of public importance."
To insure fairness and protect the public health, the Commission may
also require broadcast licensees to carry anti-smoking material.' 2
It may also classify stations for particular uses, and limit transmissions
accordingly. 13
71d. at 226.
8 Burstyn v. Wilson 343 U.S. 495, 502-503.
9 Supra note 6 at 215; Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Radio
Station 309 U.S. 470, 475.
'
0 Obscenity and Indecency, 18 U.S.C. § 1464; Lotteries, 18 U.S.C. § 1304; Rigged
Contests, 47 U.S.C. § 509(a). See Federal Communications Commission v. American Broad-
casting Co., 347 U.S. 284; New York State Broadcasters Association v. United States, 414
F. 2d 990 (C.A. 2, 1969).
1147 U.S.C. §3 15, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commission,
395 U.S. 367.
12 Banzhaf v. Federal Communications Commission, 405 F. 2d 1082 (C.A.D.C., 1968).
cert. den., 396 U.S. 842, 90 S. Ct. 50.
13 Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 278 (C.A. 2, 1965);
California Citizens Band Association, Inc. v. United States, 375 F.2d 43 (C.A. 9, 1967), cert.
den., 389 U.S. 844.
This classification authority has not been invoked to limit broadcast stations beyond the
requirement of a public purpose. However, for the wide extent of permissible Commission
interest under the Communications Act in program service, see Johnston Broadcasting Co. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 175 F. 2d 351 (C.A.D.C., 1949) consideration of
programming in comparative hearing); Bay State Beacon, Inc. v. Federal Communications
Commission 171 F. 2d 826 (C.A.D.C., 1948) (consideration of programming in comparative
hearing); Simmons v. Federal Communications Commission 169 F. 2d 670 (C.A.D.C., 1948).
cert. den. 335 U.S. 846 (denial of license where applicant proposed indiscriminately to take all
network programs offered).
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However, as the Court of Appeals stated in Banzhaf, the power to look
at content in the broadcast field can be carried too far, and the courts have
stated more than once that the Commission's proper concern is not with
the political, economic or social views of an applicant. National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States.14 This clearly appears to be a constitutional
limitation as well as one flowing from the Communications Act, and it is as
clear that the type limitation suggested by some countries would be uncon-
stitutional if applied to domestic radio in the United States.
Despite the fairly wide scope of legitimate governmental concern with
the use made of radio facilities, this concern does not extend to the
prohibition of social and political material that might stir dissatisfaction or
dissension, or conflict with national policy. The constitutionally protected
interest in robust discussion of public affairs would be sufficient to preclude
any such general restrictions on the use of radio.15
Indeed, even when the prohibition of conduct has only an indirect
impact upon speech, it must be narrowly drawn to accomplish its purpose
with as little effect as possible on free speech. 16 And, of course, the
constitutional protection does not depend on an evaluation of the popu-
larity or social utility of the ideas offered. 17
The question then, is whether the international character of the speech
would affect the validity of an attempted restriction;' 8 and it does not admit
of a precise answer.
The power of the United States to conduct its foreign affairs is plenary.
It extends to "matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being
14Supra, note 6 at 226; Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion 175 F. 2d 351, 359 (C.A.D.C., 1949).15See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I (striking down a statute which punished speech
stirring people to anger, inviting public dispute, or bringing about a condition of unrest) as
unconstitutional; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (protecting false and
defamatory statements made against public officials where actual malice was not shown);
Stromberg v. California.
It is recognized that in KFRB Broadcasting Association v. Federal Radio Commission,
47 F.2d 670 (C.A.D.C., 193 1), the Commission was sustained in denying a renewal of license
to a station regularly carrying diagnoses and prescriptions of medicine (sold by the station
owner) for ills described to the station only by mail, and in Trinity Methodist Church South v.
Federal Radio Commission, 62 F. 2d 850 (C.A.D.C., 1932), cert. den., 284 U.S. 695, 288
U.S. 599, a renewal was denied because the station continually engaged in deflamatory
attacks on public figures and religious groups. However, the first of these cases went on the
grounds of the public health and use of a station for a private, rather than a public purpose,
and emphasizing the value of robust public debate. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254; Anti-Defamation League v. Federal Communications Commission,
403 F.2d 169 (C.A.D.C., 1968), cert. den., 394 U.S. 930.
'
6Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507; Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195.
17N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445.
"
8The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestrial Bodies, signed on January 27, 1970,
requires activities in space to be in accord with the charter of the United Nations.
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that an act of Congress [alone] could not deal with."' 9 It thus has been held
sufficient to sustain a general restriction against travel to certain areas, 20
despite the First Amendment's implications. However, that a treaty in
conflict with a specific constitutional limitation upon the power of the
government cannot stand. Thus, in Reid v. Covert,2' it was held uncon-
stitutional for dependents of military personnel overseas to have been tried
for murder under the court-martial procedures of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, although such trials had been held in accordance with
executive agreements between the United States, Great Britain and Japan.
The court-martial proceedings did not include safeguards to which the
defendants would have been constitutionally entitled had they been tried in
the United States. The government contended that this practice was neces-
sary to carry out the United States' obligations. The Court stated:
The obvious and decisive answer to this, of course, is that no agreement
with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution. 22
The Court also stated:
If our foreign commitments become of such nature that the Government can
no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by the Con-
stitution, that instrument can be amended by the method which it prescribes.
But we have no authority, or inclination, to read exceptions into it which are
not there. 23
In a more recent, non-capital case, this principle was applied to hold
improper the dismissal of an armed-forces civilian employee because an
unconstitutional search of his living quarters, authorized under a treaty
between the United States and Japan, had led to his discharge. Powell v.
Zuckert, 366 F. 2d 634 (C.A.D.C., 1966).24
The resolution of a conflict between an assertion of the treaty-making
power and an assertion of the right of free speech would undoubtedly
19 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416. See also, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
299 U.S. 304.2 0Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1.
21354 U.S. I.
22 1d., at 16.
23ld.
2See also, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277, which held that shipments from
Puerto Rico could be subject to duties even though such duties are prohibited between states,
but:
There is a clear distinction between such prohibitions as go to the root of the power of
Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place, and such as are operative only throughout
the United States or among the several states.
Thus, when the Constitution declares that no bill of attainder or ex post facto laws shall
be passed, and that no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, it goes to the
competency of Congress to pass a bill of that description. Perhaps the same remark may apply
to the First Amendment... "
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depend on the precise nature of the restriction upon speech and the context
of the existing international situation. Since the purpose of licensing an
international service in the first place would differ from the purpose in
licensing a domestic service, 25 i.e., the listening and viewing public would
be not the public of the United States, but rather that of a foreign country,
the basis of regulation would also be shifted, presumably to our relations
with the countries involved. This is indicated by the Commission rule
relating to international stations, now in effect. The licensing of in-
ternational stations for specific purposes consistent with our national in-
terests abroad may raise no serious constitutional issue.
However, the attempt, once the service is authorized to proscribe some-
what vaguely defined categories of programs, raises a more serious ques-
tion. It is doubtful whether the shift to the international forum would work
such a significant change in the impact of the First Amendment as to
permit broad restrictions upon the right of Americans to express their ideas
freely, at least in the absence of some serious international situation. Of
course, if the safety of the United States were endangered there might well
be an adequate basis for stopping all international broadcasting to certain
countries, or for some other, more particularized, action. 26
III. Conclusion
Thus, in sum, the constitutionality of any limitation on the content of
international broadcasts would have to be determined in the context of the
international situation at the time, and of the nature of the limitation.
Absent special considerations, it appears that a broad prohibition in the
kind of terms already suggested by several other countries would raise
serious constitutional questions, and would probably not be sustained.
Two points made above should be emphasized: (1) That "a treaty in
conflict with a specific constitutional limitation upon the power of the
government cannot stand;" and (2) that the impact of the international
context upon the power to regulate specific content, or to "pros-
cribe... categories of programs," may not work significant changes in the
strictures of the First Amendment except in extreme cases in which the
security of the United States might be endangered.
25t is noteworthy that in Wrather-Alvarez Broadcast v. Federal Communications Com-
mission, 248 F. 2d 646 (C.A.D.C., 1957), the court held that in applying 47 U.S.C. § 325,
which requires Commission consent for the transmission of a program to a foreign station for
rebroadcast into the United States, the Commission should consider the character of the
foreign station's programming before authorizing an American network to send its programs.
No free speech issue was raised in that case.26See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I; Communications Association of America v. Douds,
339 U.S. 399-400; Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52; see also Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214.
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That a treaty may not stand against a specific constitutional limitation
could hardly be more explicitly stated than in the passage from Reid v.
Covert.2 7 Neither a general power to conduct foreign affairs, nor an implied
power associated with some other power could override the First Amend-
ment: "The very nature of our free government makes it completely in-
congruous to have a rule of law under which a group of citizens temporar-
ily in office can deprive another group of citizens" 28 of fundamental con-
stitutional rights by negotiating treaties to accomplish what could not be
accomplished by legislation. The question then is the second one set forth
above, i.e., the extent to which foreign affairs considerations and problems
arising from the content of international satellite direct broadcastings in-
teract as to permit regulation of the latter by treaty or otherwise con-
sistently with the First Amendment. 29
Consideration of this question should proceed from several hypotheses:
(1) it is only the "scarcity" of broadcasting that permits the existing scope
of its regulation; (2) Americans will be subject to the regulatory jurisdiction
of the United States, and will be protected by its Constitution even though
they broadcast through devices in outer space beyond United States juris-
diction; and (3) courts will make an independent evaluation of the impact
of such broadcasting on foreign affairs problems, without regard to existing
international agreements or the advice of the executive pro or con as
conclusive.30
It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that the courts will assess the
impact of the First Amendment upon the range of regulatory measures that
may legally be applied to international direct broadcasting from satellites
by almost exactly the same standards as apply in purely domestic cases.
A number of recent cases suggest that the courts are tending toward the
view that, in a world which technology is shrinking in size and making
more interdependent economically and politically, what happens in the
"international" sphere can have just as great an impact upon United States
citizens as what happens in the "domestic" sphere, and therefore should be
judged by the same standards so far as United States governmental action
is concerned other than in exceptional circumstances. 31
Thus, the courts could decide that the power of regulation created by
27Supra note 21 at 16-18.28Cf. Afroyin v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268.
29Obviously, precedents for regulating obscene speech or other "unprotected" activities
should be put aside in considering the central problem.
3
°See Reid v. Covert, supra note 21; ICC v. New York N.H. & H.R. Co. 372 U.S. 744,
763-64 (1963); Cf. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-41; Id. at 443 (1968) (concurring
opinion of Stewart, J.).
31See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); and U.S. v. First National City Bank,
379 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1965); and Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
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"scarcity" is no broader when Americans are broadcasting to foreigners
than when they are broadcasting to other Americans. A judicial approach
of this kind might easily be prompted by some international act prohibiting
or limiting, in some objectionable way, whole categories of broadcasts such
as political commentary or popular culture. Narrow kinds of limitations
might, of course, create greater prospects that courts would consider the
foreign "public interest" in permitting different kinds of regulations. But,
regardless of the kinds of limitations in an international act, and assuming
that serious foreign-relations problems short of war could be demonstrated
credibly to courts, courts would seem to have little motive to empower the
Executive or Congress to narrow First-Amendment rights. They are much
more likely to leave restrictions to the options open to the foreign countries
themselves to control what their people receive by jamming or by regu-
lating the capacity and use of community and home receivers.32
Whatever judicial result might ultimately be reached, we should recog-
nize that there is high risk for the constitutionality of international obliga-
tions to impose restrictions upon program content. Observing such obliga-
tions is a matter of primary importance to the United States both as a party
to more international agreements than any other country and as a supporter
of a strong peaceful system of international order.
32Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488: In a series of decisions this Court has held
that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.
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